Combinatorial auction

Results: 85



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21Vienna Lectures on Mechanism Design with Applications Jacob K. Goeree EDG and Centre for Policy and Market Design, UTS 1. Optimal Auctions (Monday 9:00 – 12:00) a. A simple example

Vienna Lectures on Mechanism Design with Applications Jacob K. Goeree EDG and Centre for Policy and Market Design, UTS 1. Optimal Auctions (Monday 9:00 – 12:00) a. A simple example

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Source URL: www.vgse.at

Language: English - Date: 2015-04-17 06:23:37
22The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions PAUL DÜTTING, Stanford University VASILIS GKATZELIS, Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-

The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions PAUL DÜTTING, Stanford University VASILIS GKATZELIS, Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-01 04:11:34
23Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt∗ First Version: May, 2007 This Version: October, 2007

Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt∗ First Version: May, 2007 This Version: October, 2007

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Source URL: economics-experiments.unimelb.edu.au

Language: English - Date: 2011-10-31 19:17:25
    24Discussion Paper NoCHARACTERIZING THE VICKREY COMBINATORIAL AUCTION BY INDUCTION Chew Soo Hong

    Discussion Paper NoCHARACTERIZING THE VICKREY COMBINATORIAL AUCTION BY INDUCTION Chew Soo Hong

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    Source URL: www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

    Language: English - Date: 2005-03-22 01:58:19
      25Computational Mechanism Design: Truthful Combinatorial Auctions and Interdependent Value Auctions Takayuki ITO, Nagoya Institute of Technology 1. Introduction and Vickrey Auctions Auction is a process of buying and selli

      Computational Mechanism Design: Truthful Combinatorial Auctions and Interdependent Value Auctions Takayuki ITO, Nagoya Institute of Technology 1. Introduction and Vickrey Auctions Auction is a process of buying and selli

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      Source URL: www.jsps.go.jp

      Language: English - Date: 2013-01-21 00:10:25
        26Microsoft Word - PDK Book Master afterwordSections IB and IC _Afterword and…

        Microsoft Word - PDK Book Master afterwordSections IB and IC _Afterword and…

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        Source URL: www.nuff.ox.ac.uk

        Language: English - Date: 2003-12-22 06:10:45
        27Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

        Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

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        Source URL: www.bm.ust.hk

        Language: English - Date: 2009-06-09 03:03:29
        28COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Paul Klemperer: Auctions: Theory and Practice is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2004, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprodu

        COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Paul Klemperer: Auctions: Theory and Practice is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2004, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprodu

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        Source URL: press.princeton.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2005-02-07 14:37:47
        29Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt∗ First Version: May, 2007 This Version: October, 2007

        Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt∗ First Version: May, 2007 This Version: October, 2007

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        Source URL: www.economics-experiments.unimelb.edu.au

        Language: English - Date: 2011-10-31 19:17:25
        30Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research–47 Submitted 03/06; publishedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms Noam Nisan

        Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research–47 Submitted 03/06; publishedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms Noam Nisan

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        Source URL: jair.org

        Language: English - Date: 2009-08-06 19:20:37